3 experiments investigated the effects on posterior probability estimates of: (1) prior probabilities, amount of data, and diagnostic impact of the data; (2) payoffs; and (3) response modes. Ss usually behaved conservatively, i.e., the difference between their prior and posterior probability estimates was less than that prescribed by Bayes' theorem. Conservatism was unaffected by prior probabilities, remained constant as the amount of data increased, and decreased as the diagnostic value of each datum decreased. More learning occurred under payoff than under nonpayoff conditions and between-S variance was less under payoff conditions. Estimates were most nearly Bayesian under the (formally inappropriate) linear payoff, but considerable over...
We investigate human departures from Bayesian optimality in an inference task in which subjects esti...
In this thesis, we first propose a coherent inference model that is obtained by distorting the prior...
Bayesian theories of cognition assume that people can integrate probabilities rationally. However, s...
Subjects were presented with data, described as the simulated output of a computerized radar system,...
Comparing the responses of participants in reasoning experiments to the normative standard of Bayes...
n a simple experimental environment a group of subjects was asked to give estimates of a second grou...
When people revise subjective probabilities in light of data, revisions are less than the amount pre...
Human revision of opinion has often been described as a list of heuristics and cognitive biases. The...
The present study was designed to examine whether the conservatism present in a Bayesian probability...
We report five experiments in which the role of background beliefs in social judgments of posterior ...
Subjects saw samples from each of two populations of numbers and made intuitive inferences about whi...
Many studies have examined the extent to which individuals’ probability judgments depart from Bayes’...
The present study investigated the effects of prior probability, mode of presenting information, and...
The age-old question of the generalizability of the results of experiments that are conducted in art...
Bayesian theories of cognition assume that people can integrate probabilities rationally. However, s...
We investigate human departures from Bayesian optimality in an inference task in which subjects esti...
In this thesis, we first propose a coherent inference model that is obtained by distorting the prior...
Bayesian theories of cognition assume that people can integrate probabilities rationally. However, s...
Subjects were presented with data, described as the simulated output of a computerized radar system,...
Comparing the responses of participants in reasoning experiments to the normative standard of Bayes...
n a simple experimental environment a group of subjects was asked to give estimates of a second grou...
When people revise subjective probabilities in light of data, revisions are less than the amount pre...
Human revision of opinion has often been described as a list of heuristics and cognitive biases. The...
The present study was designed to examine whether the conservatism present in a Bayesian probability...
We report five experiments in which the role of background beliefs in social judgments of posterior ...
Subjects saw samples from each of two populations of numbers and made intuitive inferences about whi...
Many studies have examined the extent to which individuals’ probability judgments depart from Bayes’...
The present study investigated the effects of prior probability, mode of presenting information, and...
The age-old question of the generalizability of the results of experiments that are conducted in art...
Bayesian theories of cognition assume that people can integrate probabilities rationally. However, s...
We investigate human departures from Bayesian optimality in an inference task in which subjects esti...
In this thesis, we first propose a coherent inference model that is obtained by distorting the prior...
Bayesian theories of cognition assume that people can integrate probabilities rationally. However, s...