This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for deterrence, should not apply the no-effect rule of illegal contracts uniformly and why they should vary the type of relief according to the factual setting. It posits that a graduated relief structure will maximize efficient deterrence. An efficient deterrence scheme will preserve limited personal, judicial and societal resources without burdening legitimate transactions
This Article will demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does not and cannot deter police misconduct...
Traditional coercion theories and elements are simply inadequate as an exclusive focus of analysis i...
Contract rules can be justified by utilitarian theories (such as efficiency theory), which are conce...
This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for d...
This Chapter prepared for the Cambridge Handbook of Compliance reviews the key findings of the optim...
The majority of American jurisdictions do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract unless t...
This article examines the history of interference with contract and tortious interference with busin...
The theory of efficient breach is the best known, and the most controversial, product of nearly half...
This article examines an under-explored reason to have contract law: conflict minimization. An impor...
This article sets forth a new model of “notice” and deterrence that helps explain some long-standing...
This article considers the relevance of several kinds of post-offense events for the justice of puni...
The law of contracts is complex but remarkably stable. What we lack is a widely accepted interpretat...
For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antit...
Despite courts\u27 and commentators\u27 denial of morality and focus on efficiency in contract law, ...
This Article discusses the Supreme Court’s use of the concepts of culpability and deterrence in its ...
This Article will demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does not and cannot deter police misconduct...
Traditional coercion theories and elements are simply inadequate as an exclusive focus of analysis i...
Contract rules can be justified by utilitarian theories (such as efficiency theory), which are conce...
This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for d...
This Chapter prepared for the Cambridge Handbook of Compliance reviews the key findings of the optim...
The majority of American jurisdictions do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract unless t...
This article examines the history of interference with contract and tortious interference with busin...
The theory of efficient breach is the best known, and the most controversial, product of nearly half...
This article examines an under-explored reason to have contract law: conflict minimization. An impor...
This article sets forth a new model of “notice” and deterrence that helps explain some long-standing...
This article considers the relevance of several kinds of post-offense events for the justice of puni...
The law of contracts is complex but remarkably stable. What we lack is a widely accepted interpretat...
For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antit...
Despite courts\u27 and commentators\u27 denial of morality and focus on efficiency in contract law, ...
This Article discusses the Supreme Court’s use of the concepts of culpability and deterrence in its ...
This Article will demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does not and cannot deter police misconduct...
Traditional coercion theories and elements are simply inadequate as an exclusive focus of analysis i...
Contract rules can be justified by utilitarian theories (such as efficiency theory), which are conce...