Add to ORKGI present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget constraints in the combinatorial auction setting and show that they are Pareto-Optimal and (partially) incentive compatible in certain domains
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions. It is u...
We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, indiv...
I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget con...
This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design pe...
This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design pe...
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairl...
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairl...
In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we...
We study the complexity of bidding optimally in one-shot combinatorial auction mechanisms. Specifica...
For allocation problems with one or more items, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism...
We explore interesting potential extensions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) rule under the assump...
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions. It is u...
We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, indiv...
I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget con...
This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design pe...
This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design pe...
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairl...
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairl...
In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we...
We study the complexity of bidding optimally in one-shot combinatorial auction mechanisms. Specifica...
For allocation problems with one or more items, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism...
We explore interesting potential extensions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) rule under the assump...
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the cont...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions. It is u...
We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, indiv...