When there is strategic complementarity of consumption between neighbors in a social network, we find that certain consumers may have a bigger impact than other consumers on the market demand and therefore the equilibrium price. The influence that a particular consumer has on the market demand depends on the network structure and the consumer’s location in the network. This analysis may, for example, shed light on the segment of consumers that should be the target of selective advertisements or promotions
We analyse the roles of social network topology and size on the monopoly pricing of network goods in...
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it ...
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it ...
When there is strategic complementarity of consumption between neighbors in a social network, we fin...
Thesis advisor: Richard J. ArnottThis dissertation comprises three papers that are concerned with th...
Two identical firms compete in prices. A finite number of consumers is linked in a social network. C...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
We analyse the roles of social network topology and size on the monopoly pricing of network goods in...
We analyse the roles of social network topology and size on the monopoly pricing of network goods in...
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it ...
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it ...
When there is strategic complementarity of consumption between neighbors in a social network, we fin...
Thesis advisor: Richard J. ArnottThis dissertation comprises three papers that are concerned with th...
Two identical firms compete in prices. A finite number of consumers is linked in a social network. C...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
International audienceWe analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where ag...
We analyse the roles of social network topology and size on the monopoly pricing of network goods in...
We analyse the roles of social network topology and size on the monopoly pricing of network goods in...
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it ...
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it ...