This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of two regions, a monopolist firm supplies an input to two consumer goods firms that compete in quantities. The interaction between the firms is modelled by means of a three-stage game, where the firms first select locations, then the upstream firm chooses thedelivered prices of the intermediate good, and finally the downstream firmsselect quantitiesofthe final good. It is concluded that agglomeration is more likely to occur when the ratio between the transport cost of the intermediate good and the transport cost of the final good is higher. If this proportion is low, the existence of an agglomeration varies nonmonotonically with transport costs
In a game where firms select locations, technological interactions through the exchange of intermedi...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can differ...
We analyse a two-stage location-quantity game with many firms and two regions. We show that the firm...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper models, in game-theoretical terms, the location of two vertically-linked monopolistic fir...
This paper models the location of two vertically-related firms in a low labor cost country and in a ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
In a game where firms select locations, technological interactions through the exchange of intermedi...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can differ...
We analyse a two-stage location-quantity game with many firms and two regions. We show that the firm...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper models, in game-theoretical terms, the location of two vertically-linked monopolistic fir...
This paper models the location of two vertically-related firms in a low labor cost country and in a ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...
This paper considers the locational choice of firms in an upstream and a downstream industry. Both i...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
In a game where firms select locations, technological interactions through the exchange of intermedi...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can differ...
We analyse a two-stage location-quantity game with many firms and two regions. We show that the firm...