Add to ORKGThis paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative
Abstract: This paper analyzes the rationale for delegating monetary pol-icy to an in°ation-averse ce...
Final version published in International Journal of Central Banking. Earlier version published as SS...
What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This paper investigates the issue in a fram...
This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering...
Kobayashi (2003) aims to show that, in a model without inflationary bias, an increase in the degree ...
The thesis consists of four chapters, which discuss the different aspects of macroeconomic policy el...
This paper extends the model of Chortareas and Miller (2003) to the case of a continuum of central b...
In this paper we study the delegation of monetary policy to independent central bankers in a two cou...
This dissertation offers two perspectives on the making of monetary policy under uncertainty. The fi...
We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under...
Approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problem provides a useful framework for interpretin...
The aim of this paper is to bring together two recent developments in the ”contracting” approach to ...
This is an Appendix to "The Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Small Open Economy" F...
This paper examines whether reputation concerns can induce the central bank to implement the time-in...
Some authors have argued that multiplicative uncertainty may benefit society as the cautionary motiv...
Abstract: This paper analyzes the rationale for delegating monetary pol-icy to an in°ation-averse ce...
Final version published in International Journal of Central Banking. Earlier version published as SS...
What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This paper investigates the issue in a fram...
This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering...
Kobayashi (2003) aims to show that, in a model without inflationary bias, an increase in the degree ...
The thesis consists of four chapters, which discuss the different aspects of macroeconomic policy el...
This paper extends the model of Chortareas and Miller (2003) to the case of a continuum of central b...
In this paper we study the delegation of monetary policy to independent central bankers in a two cou...
This dissertation offers two perspectives on the making of monetary policy under uncertainty. The fi...
We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under...
Approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problem provides a useful framework for interpretin...
The aim of this paper is to bring together two recent developments in the ”contracting” approach to ...
This is an Appendix to "The Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Small Open Economy" F...
This paper examines whether reputation concerns can induce the central bank to implement the time-in...
Some authors have argued that multiplicative uncertainty may benefit society as the cautionary motiv...
Abstract: This paper analyzes the rationale for delegating monetary pol-icy to an in°ation-averse ce...
Final version published in International Journal of Central Banking. Earlier version published as SS...
What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This paper investigates the issue in a fram...