Add to ORKGThis paper proposes the notion of E-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose the use of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places Mechanism. It endows students a position according with the Gale and Shapley students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is E-stable, i.e. efficient, fair and immune to any justifiable objection that students can formulate
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented aroun...
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented aroun...
It is well known in the school assignment literature that it is impossible for a strategyproof mecha...
This paper proposes the notion of E-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propo...
This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efciency and fairness. We propose...
This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efciency and fairness. We propose...
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency an...
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency an...
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency an...
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal S...
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal S...
This paper provides an `escape route' from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice prob...
This paper provides an `escape route' from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice prob...
We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as α...
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal S...
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented aroun...
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented aroun...
It is well known in the school assignment literature that it is impossible for a strategyproof mecha...
This paper proposes the notion of E-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propo...
This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efciency and fairness. We propose...
This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efciency and fairness. We propose...
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency an...
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency an...
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency an...
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal S...
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal S...
This paper provides an `escape route' from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice prob...
This paper provides an `escape route' from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice prob...
We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as α...
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal S...
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented aroun...
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented aroun...
It is well known in the school assignment literature that it is impossible for a strategyproof mecha...