Prospect Theory (1979) and its Cumulative version (1992) argue for probability weighting to explain lottery choices. Decision Utility Theory presents an alternative solution, which makes no use of this concept. The new theory distinguishes decision and perception utility, postulates a double S-shaped decision utility curve similar to one hypothesized by Markowitz (1952), and applies the expected decision utility value similarly to the theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Decision Utility Theory proposes straightforward risk measures, presents a simple explanation of risk attitudes by using the aspiration level concept, and predicts that people might not consider probabilities and outcomes jointly, on the contrary to the expected ut...
This paper advances an interpretation of Von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility model for prefer...
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative assumptions: t...
Prospect theory, used descriptively for decisions under both risk and certainty, presumes concave ut...
Prospect Theory (1979) and its Cumulative version (1992) argue for probability weighting to explain ...
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Cumulative Prospect Theory is a serious alternative...
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and O...
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and O...
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Cumulative Prospect Theory is a serious alternative...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by Kahneman and...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by Kahneman and...
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and O...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by Kahneman and...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by Kahneman and...
This paper proposes a new decision theory of how individuals make random errors when they compute th...
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative assumptions: t...
This paper advances an interpretation of Von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility model for prefer...
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative assumptions: t...
Prospect theory, used descriptively for decisions under both risk and certainty, presumes concave ut...
Prospect Theory (1979) and its Cumulative version (1992) argue for probability weighting to explain ...
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Cumulative Prospect Theory is a serious alternative...
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and O...
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and O...
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Cumulative Prospect Theory is a serious alternative...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by Kahneman and...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by Kahneman and...
The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and O...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by Kahneman and...
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of the experimental data published by Kahneman and...
This paper proposes a new decision theory of how individuals make random errors when they compute th...
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative assumptions: t...
This paper advances an interpretation of Von Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility model for prefer...
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative assumptions: t...
Prospect theory, used descriptively for decisions under both risk and certainty, presumes concave ut...