The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs are introduced by Ely and Pęski (2006) in their study of interim rationalizability. We study the connection between the two concepts. We say that two type spaces are equivalent if they represent the same set of hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs. We show that the correlation embedded in equivalent type spaces can be characterized by partially correlating devices, which send correlated signals to players in a belief invariant way. Since such correlating devices also implement the Bayesian solution, we establish that the Bayesian solution is invariant across equivalent type spaces
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In games with in...
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descripti...
We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomple...
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchi...
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchi...
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchi...
textThis dissertation consists of three essays in Economic Theory. The rst essay proposes and studi...
In game theory, there is a basic methodological dichotomy between Harsanyi's "game-theoretic" view a...
textThis dissertation consists of three essays in Economic Theory. The rst essay proposes and studi...
We study a model of correlated equilibrium where every player takes actions based on his hierarchies...
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descripti...
We study a model of correlated equilibrium where every player takes actions based on his hierarchies...
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are in-complete as descript...
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In games with in...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In games with in...
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descripti...
We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomple...
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchi...
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchi...
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchi...
textThis dissertation consists of three essays in Economic Theory. The rst essay proposes and studi...
In game theory, there is a basic methodological dichotomy between Harsanyi's "game-theoretic" view a...
textThis dissertation consists of three essays in Economic Theory. The rst essay proposes and studi...
We study a model of correlated equilibrium where every player takes actions based on his hierarchies...
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descripti...
We study a model of correlated equilibrium where every player takes actions based on his hierarchies...
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are in-complete as descript...
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In games with in...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In games with in...
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descripti...
We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomple...