Add to ORKGThis paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of alternative solutions to a common-pool resource with a unidirectional flow. The focus is on the comparative economic efficiency of communications, bilateral “Coasian” bargaining, auctions and price-based allocations. All treatments improve allocative efficiency relative to a baseline environment. Communication and bilateral bargaining are not generally as effective as market allocations. An exogenously imposed, optimal fee results in the greatest efficiency gain, followed by auction allocations that determine the usage fee endogenously
In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with het...
Managing water quality is of critical interest to policy-makers in New Zealand and globally. In par...
We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of diff...
This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of alternative solutions to a comm...
We use lab experiments to study policies that address common pool resource overuse. We look at a pri...
Heterogeneity is considered harmful for cooperation in common-pool resource extraction. In this stud...
Common property resources and public goods are two of the most common forms of market failures studi...
We test in a laboratory experiment three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game: an acce...
We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of diff...
The commons dilemma is a situation where a group of individuals jointly use a resource, and an indiv...
The early literature on common pool resources focused on the race for appropriation among users and ...
Efficient allocations in common-pool resources cannot be accomplished when appropriators are selfish...
Elinor Ostrom, a professor at Indiana University, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (...
This paper provides an experimental testing ground for an equal output-sharing partnership approach ...
We test how a monopoly, a duopoly and a public monopoly manage and allocate water resources. Stock d...
In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with het...
Managing water quality is of critical interest to policy-makers in New Zealand and globally. In par...
We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of diff...
This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of alternative solutions to a comm...
We use lab experiments to study policies that address common pool resource overuse. We look at a pri...
Heterogeneity is considered harmful for cooperation in common-pool resource extraction. In this stud...
Common property resources and public goods are two of the most common forms of market failures studi...
We test in a laboratory experiment three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game: an acce...
We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of diff...
The commons dilemma is a situation where a group of individuals jointly use a resource, and an indiv...
The early literature on common pool resources focused on the race for appropriation among users and ...
Efficient allocations in common-pool resources cannot be accomplished when appropriators are selfish...
Elinor Ostrom, a professor at Indiana University, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (...
This paper provides an experimental testing ground for an equal output-sharing partnership approach ...
We test how a monopoly, a duopoly and a public monopoly manage and allocate water resources. Stock d...
In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with het...
Managing water quality is of critical interest to policy-makers in New Zealand and globally. In par...
We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of diff...