In a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distance from the candidate and a candidate's quality. Candidate quality can potentially bias the measure of ideological distance in two ways. First, voters may be more drawn to high quality candidates thereby reducing the ideological distance. Second, a candidate's ideological position is a function of rivals�qualities and his own quality. We derive a theoretical model to sign the direction of both biases analytically. Next, using techniques established in the industrial organization literature, we estimate the model using two sets of instrumental variables
In this paper I demonstrate that the distribution of votes influences the theoretical predictions fo...
When people vote, does their preferred candidate represent the policies that are best for them? Not ...
Spatial models of political competition are typically based on two assumptions. One is that all the ...
In a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distanc...
In a spatial model of voting, a voters utility for a candidate is a func-tion of ideological distanc...
This article provides direct estimates of the parameters of spatial utility models of voting using d...
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium ...
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one-dimensional policy space, the equilibrium ...
This paper introduces a model where elections are games where voters have preferences over a public ...
Examines the use of spatial models in analyzing an electoral process. Conceptualizations of the set ...
Spatial models of voting have dominated mathematical political theory since the seminal work of Down...
The application of spatial voting theories to popular elections presupposes an electorate that choos...
We propose a modified spatial-voting rule to explain why congressional candidates adopt more extreme...
We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and com...
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elec...
In this paper I demonstrate that the distribution of votes influences the theoretical predictions fo...
When people vote, does their preferred candidate represent the policies that are best for them? Not ...
Spatial models of political competition are typically based on two assumptions. One is that all the ...
In a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distanc...
In a spatial model of voting, a voters utility for a candidate is a func-tion of ideological distanc...
This article provides direct estimates of the parameters of spatial utility models of voting using d...
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium ...
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one-dimensional policy space, the equilibrium ...
This paper introduces a model where elections are games where voters have preferences over a public ...
Examines the use of spatial models in analyzing an electoral process. Conceptualizations of the set ...
Spatial models of voting have dominated mathematical political theory since the seminal work of Down...
The application of spatial voting theories to popular elections presupposes an electorate that choos...
We propose a modified spatial-voting rule to explain why congressional candidates adopt more extreme...
We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and com...
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elec...
In this paper I demonstrate that the distribution of votes influences the theoretical predictions fo...
When people vote, does their preferred candidate represent the policies that are best for them? Not ...
Spatial models of political competition are typically based on two assumptions. One is that all the ...