Add to ORKGThis paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies
public goods, voluntary contributions, provision point, experiments, information, group size, Resour...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-...
Kuzmics C, Steg J-H. On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budge...
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framewor...
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framewor...
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individ...
We present two resilient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. Both mechanisms adopt a kno...
We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second fo...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in an economy that is l...
In this paper we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibr...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
This paper characterizes the optimal contract designed by a profit-maximizing monopolist, who can pr...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care not only about t...
This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents’...
public goods, voluntary contributions, provision point, experiments, information, group size, Resour...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-...
Kuzmics C, Steg J-H. On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budge...
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framewor...
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framewor...
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individ...
We present two resilient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. Both mechanisms adopt a kno...
We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second fo...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in an economy that is l...
In this paper we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibr...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
This paper characterizes the optimal contract designed by a profit-maximizing monopolist, who can pr...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care not only about t...
This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents’...
public goods, voluntary contributions, provision point, experiments, information, group size, Resour...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-...
Kuzmics C, Steg J-H. On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budge...