This paper reports results of an incentivized laboratory experiment manipulating an extremely weak social cue in the Dictator Game. Prior to making their decision, we present dictators with a simple visual stimlulus: either three dots in a “watching-eyes” configuration, or three dots in a neutral configuration. The watching-eyes configuration is suggestive of a schematic face—a stimuli that is known to weakly activate the fusiform face area of the brain (Tong, et al., 2000; Bednar and Miikkulainen, 2003; Johnson and Morton, 1991). Given the experimental evidence for automatic priming of watching eyes of others, it is thus reasonable to hypothesize that even though the social cue is very weak, this activation might be sufficient to produce a s...
Previous experimental literature on reputation studies its effects in environments where they are of...
Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when inform...
International audienceIn this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and obser...
This paper reports results of an incentivized laboratory experiment manipulating an extremely weak s...
Giving to others is individually costly, yet generates benefits to the recipient. Such altruistic be...
In our experimental study, we investigated whether cues of being watched positively affect prosocial...
Recent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subj...
Dictator giving games often demonstrate that nonverbal social cues, such as drawn-in eyes on display...
Recent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subj...
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game, we expected Dictators' empathy toward the Recipients to ...
Anonymity is often offered in economic experiments in order to eliminate observer effects and induce...
Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented her...
<div><p>Anonymity is often offered in economic experiments in order to eliminate observer effects an...
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game we expected Dictators’ empathy towards the Recipients to ...
In a dictator game, participants give higher offers to their partner when a pair of eyes is present ...
Previous experimental literature on reputation studies its effects in environments where they are of...
Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when inform...
International audienceIn this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and obser...
This paper reports results of an incentivized laboratory experiment manipulating an extremely weak s...
Giving to others is individually costly, yet generates benefits to the recipient. Such altruistic be...
In our experimental study, we investigated whether cues of being watched positively affect prosocial...
Recent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subj...
Dictator giving games often demonstrate that nonverbal social cues, such as drawn-in eyes on display...
Recent bargaining experiments demonstrated an impact of anonymity and incomplete information on subj...
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game, we expected Dictators' empathy toward the Recipients to ...
Anonymity is often offered in economic experiments in order to eliminate observer effects and induce...
Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented her...
<div><p>Anonymity is often offered in economic experiments in order to eliminate observer effects an...
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game we expected Dictators’ empathy towards the Recipients to ...
In a dictator game, participants give higher offers to their partner when a pair of eyes is present ...
Previous experimental literature on reputation studies its effects in environments where they are of...
Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when inform...
International audienceIn this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and obser...