Substance and Skepticism in Hume's Treatise

Abstract Nathan Robert Cox, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy, April 20th 2011 University of Kansas 1.4.5 of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature provides several reasons for close, sustained reading and general concern for interpreters of Hume. First, the question of the metaphysics of substance is a major issue for early modern philosophers. Second, in this section, Hume makes some of his most careful and dense arguments in the entire Treatise. The neglect of 1.4.5 has kept these arguments from receiving all the consideration that they deserve. Third, there are at least three novel positions that Hume argues for here that he does not argue for elsewhere. I shall divide my project thematically with respect to Hume's arguments in 1.4.5. Chapter 1 details a series of arguments against the intelligibility of the concept `substance'. Chapter 2 concerns arguments which attempt to conjoin the material with the immaterial. Chapter 3 focuses on the positions of Spinoza and those of the Theologians as regards substance and the immateriality of the soul. An amendment to the Theologians' arguments examines the advantage of substituting the concept of `action' for the concept of `modification' in arguments for the existence of substance. Hume rejects both Spinoza's position and that of the Theologians, as well as their proposed amendment. Chapter 4 is directed at arguments against the possibility of matter causing mind and Hume's defense of the contrary. Finally, Chapter 5 turns briefly to the implications of 1.4.5 for 1.4.6, Of personal identity