In Intel, the General Court confirms the jurisprudence considering as inherently illegal the provision of financial advantages by dominant firms in exchange for exclusivity commitments, as part of a fidelity-enhancing mechanism or in exchange for a commitment to restrict the sale of competing products. This ruling casts doubt on the viability of the idea, central in the Guidance Paper on Article 102 TFEU, that in order to bring an action against dominant companies, it is necessary to establish with the assistance of specific economic models the existence of a concrete, negative harm caused to consumers
: The case comment attempts to seek arguments to defend the formalistic approach adopted by the Gene...
On 20 October 2016, Advocate General (AG) Wahl delivered its Opinion in Intel’s appeal to the Court ...
This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competiti...
International audienceIn Intel, the General Court confirms the jurisprudence considering as inherent...
The Intel ruling wi ll significantly affect EU competition law. It confirmsthat there cannot be per se...
Intel, a US-based company, was fined by the European Commission in 2009 for abusing its dominant pos...
Analyses the European Commission guidance paper of December 2008 on the enforcement of the EC Treaty...
Article 102 TFEU prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings in a dominant position. A dominant ...
In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commission that condemned Intel for br...
In June 2014, the General Court of the EU delivered its judgment in Intel. The debates to which it h...
O objetivo do presente artigo é analisar a evolução da Teoria dos Efeitos no direito concorrencial d...
This book offers an in-depth legal analysis concerning the notion of restrictions of competition, be...
This webinar discusses the EU Court of Justice’s long-awaited Intel judgment on the treatment of dis...
The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) new legal attack on Intel threatens to leave the company a ...
The problem of the antimonopoly regulation and stimulation of the development of competition is beco...
: The case comment attempts to seek arguments to defend the formalistic approach adopted by the Gene...
On 20 October 2016, Advocate General (AG) Wahl delivered its Opinion in Intel’s appeal to the Court ...
This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competiti...
International audienceIn Intel, the General Court confirms the jurisprudence considering as inherent...
The Intel ruling wi ll significantly affect EU competition law. It confirmsthat there cannot be per se...
Intel, a US-based company, was fined by the European Commission in 2009 for abusing its dominant pos...
Analyses the European Commission guidance paper of December 2008 on the enforcement of the EC Treaty...
Article 102 TFEU prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings in a dominant position. A dominant ...
In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commission that condemned Intel for br...
In June 2014, the General Court of the EU delivered its judgment in Intel. The debates to which it h...
O objetivo do presente artigo é analisar a evolução da Teoria dos Efeitos no direito concorrencial d...
This book offers an in-depth legal analysis concerning the notion of restrictions of competition, be...
This webinar discusses the EU Court of Justice’s long-awaited Intel judgment on the treatment of dis...
The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) new legal attack on Intel threatens to leave the company a ...
The problem of the antimonopoly regulation and stimulation of the development of competition is beco...
: The case comment attempts to seek arguments to defend the formalistic approach adopted by the Gene...
On 20 October 2016, Advocate General (AG) Wahl delivered its Opinion in Intel’s appeal to the Court ...
This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competiti...