This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pierre (2004, 2005) and their adaptation to dynamical games. The inertia function associates with any initial state-control pair the smallest of the worst norms over time of the velocities of the controls regulating viable evolutions. For tychastic systems (parameterized systems where the parameters are tyches, disturbances, perturbations, etc.), the palicinesia of a tyche measure the worst norm over time of the velocities of the tyches. The palicinesia function is the largest palicinesia threshold c such that all evolutions with palicinesia smaller than or equal to c are viable. For dynamical games where one parameter is the control and the ot...
International audienceThis paper proposes an extension to a family of evolutionary game dynamics cal...
This paper explores the medium-run behaviour of bounded rational players in repeatedly played games ...
A dynamical model of a non-antagonistic evolutionary game for two coalitions is considered. The mode...
This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pi...
International audienceAiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-term convergence...
Abstract. We derive a class of inertial dynamics for games and constrained op-timization problems ov...
Abstract In this paper we study the learning behavior of a population of boundedly rational players ...
We use in this chapter the viability/capturability approach for studying the problem of dynamic valu...
Existence of viable (controlled invariant) solutions of a control problem regulated by absolutely co...
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
Abstract — We describe and implement an algorithm for computing the set of reachable states of a con...
This book offers a systematic introduction to the optimal stochastic control theory via the dynamic ...
Advanced methods of the theory of optimal control and generalized minimax solutions of Hamilton-Jaco...
We introduce in this paper the concept of “impulse evolutionary game”. Examples of evolutionary game...
International audienceThis paper proposes an extension to a family of evolutionary game dynamics cal...
This paper explores the medium-run behaviour of bounded rational players in repeatedly played games ...
A dynamical model of a non-antagonistic evolutionary game for two coalitions is considered. The mode...
This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pi...
International audienceAiming to provide a new class of game dynamics with good long-term convergence...
Abstract. We derive a class of inertial dynamics for games and constrained op-timization problems ov...
Abstract In this paper we study the learning behavior of a population of boundedly rational players ...
We use in this chapter the viability/capturability approach for studying the problem of dynamic valu...
Existence of viable (controlled invariant) solutions of a control problem regulated by absolutely co...
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a cl...
Abstract — We describe and implement an algorithm for computing the set of reachable states of a con...
This book offers a systematic introduction to the optimal stochastic control theory via the dynamic ...
Advanced methods of the theory of optimal control and generalized minimax solutions of Hamilton-Jaco...
We introduce in this paper the concept of “impulse evolutionary game”. Examples of evolutionary game...
International audienceThis paper proposes an extension to a family of evolutionary game dynamics cal...
This paper explores the medium-run behaviour of bounded rational players in repeatedly played games ...
A dynamical model of a non-antagonistic evolutionary game for two coalitions is considered. The mode...