Add to ORKGIn this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal coverage and the optimal preventive effort are higher than with perfect information.ou
Long-term insurance contracts are widespread, particularly in public health and the labor market. Su...
In the linear coinsurance problem, examined first by Mossin (1968), a higher absolute risk aversion ...
In the linear coinsurance problem, examined Örst by Mossin (1968), a higher risk aversion with respe...
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivaria...
In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance contract with adverse selection ...
Assurance-maladie; Assurance; Polices; ContratsIn this paper, we want to characterize the optimal he...
International audienceWe analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral haz-ard...
In the literature on optimal indemnity schedules, indemnities are usually restricted to be non-negat...
The principle of indemnity is well-accepted in the field of insurance and is also commonly assumed i...
The thesis consists of an introductory chapter, followed by three chapters which all deal with theor...
The principle of indemnity is well-accepted in the field of insurance and is also commonly assumed i...
Based on Bernard et al.’s research, we focus on the Pareto optimal insurance design with the insured...
In the literature on optimal indemnity schedules, indemnities are usually restricted to be non-negat...
Health insurance is considered to be a special type of nonlife insurance with two important features...
Cet article examine l’incidence du type sanitaire sur le contrat d’assurance maladie en présence d’a...
Long-term insurance contracts are widespread, particularly in public health and the labor market. Su...
In the linear coinsurance problem, examined first by Mossin (1968), a higher absolute risk aversion ...
In the linear coinsurance problem, examined Örst by Mossin (1968), a higher risk aversion with respe...
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivaria...
In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance contract with adverse selection ...
Assurance-maladie; Assurance; Polices; ContratsIn this paper, we want to characterize the optimal he...
International audienceWe analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral haz-ard...
In the literature on optimal indemnity schedules, indemnities are usually restricted to be non-negat...
The principle of indemnity is well-accepted in the field of insurance and is also commonly assumed i...
The thesis consists of an introductory chapter, followed by three chapters which all deal with theor...
The principle of indemnity is well-accepted in the field of insurance and is also commonly assumed i...
Based on Bernard et al.’s research, we focus on the Pareto optimal insurance design with the insured...
In the literature on optimal indemnity schedules, indemnities are usually restricted to be non-negat...
Health insurance is considered to be a special type of nonlife insurance with two important features...
Cet article examine l’incidence du type sanitaire sur le contrat d’assurance maladie en présence d’a...
Long-term insurance contracts are widespread, particularly in public health and the labor market. Su...
In the linear coinsurance problem, examined first by Mossin (1968), a higher absolute risk aversion ...
In the linear coinsurance problem, examined Örst by Mossin (1968), a higher risk aversion with respe...