Add to ORKGNous donnons un exemple de jeu pour lequel, sous la dynamique des réplicateurs et pour un ensemble ouvert de conditions initiales, toutes les stratégies jouées en équilibre corrélé sont éliminées.We present a family of games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from an open set of initial conditions, all strategies used in correlated equilibrium are eliminated.ou
AbstractThe Replicator Equations introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [1] are examined in the conti...
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibr...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
We present a family of games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from an open set of initia...
International audienceIt is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in corr...
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may...
Résumé: Cette note établit que dans tous les jeux 3-3 symmetriques, la dynamique des réplicateurs él...
This note establishes that in every 3-3 symmetric game, the replicator dynamics eliminates all strat...
Le fichier accessible ci-dessous est une version également éditée dans les Cahiers de la Chaire "Les...
We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In...
We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of...
International audienceIf a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the...
This dissertation consists of three parts, the first two in game theory and the third one in theoret...
Evolutionary dynamics combines game theory and nonlinear dynamics to model competition in biological...
Most existing results of evolutionary games restrict only to the Nash equilibrium. This paper introd...
AbstractThe Replicator Equations introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [1] are examined in the conti...
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibr...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
We present a family of games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from an open set of initia...
International audienceIt is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in corr...
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may...
Résumé: Cette note établit que dans tous les jeux 3-3 symmetriques, la dynamique des réplicateurs él...
This note establishes that in every 3-3 symmetric game, the replicator dynamics eliminates all strat...
Le fichier accessible ci-dessous est une version également éditée dans les Cahiers de la Chaire "Les...
We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In...
We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of...
International audienceIf a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the...
This dissertation consists of three parts, the first two in game theory and the third one in theoret...
Evolutionary dynamics combines game theory and nonlinear dynamics to model competition in biological...
Most existing results of evolutionary games restrict only to the Nash equilibrium. This paper introd...
AbstractThe Replicator Equations introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [1] are examined in the conti...
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibr...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...