It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.ou
Evolutionary dynamics combines game theory and nonlinear dynamics to model competition in biological...
We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. A...
We compare replicator dynamics for some simple games with and without the addition of conformist bia...
International audienceIt is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in corr...
We present a family of games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from an open set of initia...
Nous donnons un exemple de jeu pour lequel, sous la dynamique des réplicateurs et pour un ensembl...
International audienceWe show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used ...
This note establishes that in every 3-3 symmetric game, the replicator dynamics eliminates all strat...
Résumé: Cette note établit que dans tous les jeux 3-3 symmetriques, la dynamique des réplicateurs él...
Hart and Mas-Colell [2000] show that if all players play “regret-matching” strategies, i.e., they pl...
We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In...
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game ...
We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of...
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibr...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
Evolutionary dynamics combines game theory and nonlinear dynamics to model competition in biological...
We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. A...
We compare replicator dynamics for some simple games with and without the addition of conformist bia...
International audienceIt is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in corr...
We present a family of games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from an open set of initia...
Nous donnons un exemple de jeu pour lequel, sous la dynamique des réplicateurs et pour un ensembl...
International audienceWe show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used ...
This note establishes that in every 3-3 symmetric game, the replicator dynamics eliminates all strat...
Résumé: Cette note établit que dans tous les jeux 3-3 symmetriques, la dynamique des réplicateurs él...
Hart and Mas-Colell [2000] show that if all players play “regret-matching” strategies, i.e., they pl...
We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In...
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game ...
We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of...
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibr...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
Evolutionary dynamics combines game theory and nonlinear dynamics to model competition in biological...
We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. A...
We compare replicator dynamics for some simple games with and without the addition of conformist bia...
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