Let N=pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem can be attacked by using the key equation ed−k(p−1)(q−1)=1 . Similarly, some variants of RSA, such as RSA combined with singular elliptic curves, LUC and RSA with Gaussian primes can be attacked by using the key equation ed−k(p2−1)(q2−1)=1 . In this paper, we consider the more general equation eu−(p2−1)(q2−1)v=w and present a new attack that finds the prime factors p and q in the case that u, v and w satisfy some specific conditions. The attack is based on Coppersmith\u27s technique and improves the former attacks
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
International audienceThis paper presents three new attacks on the RSA cryptosystem. The first two a...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the ...
Let $N=pq$ be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the RSA cryptosystem, such...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus and e be a public exponent. Numerous attacks on R...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus and e be a public exponent. Numerous attacks on R...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus and e be a public exponent. Numerous attacks on R...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem ...
This paper proposes new attacks on RSA modulus of type N = p²q. Given k RSA moduli Nі = p²iqi for k ...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
International audienceThis paper presents three new attacks on the RSA cryptosystem. The first two a...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the ...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the ...
Let $N=pq$ be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. Some variants of the RSA cryptosystem, such...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus and e be a public exponent. Numerous attacks on R...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus and e be a public exponent. Numerous attacks on R...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus and e be a public exponent. Numerous attacks on R...
International audienceLet N = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown factorization. The RSA cryptosystem ...
This paper proposes new attacks on RSA modulus of type N = p²q. Given k RSA moduli Nі = p²iqi for k ...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
International audienceWe present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-ulus N = p^r q. In th...
International audienceThis paper presents three new attacks on the RSA cryptosystem. The first two a...