God’s Intellectual Battles: William Lane Craig, Philosophical Arguments, and Public Engagement

In the early twenty-first century, public discussions about God have moved on from simplistic ‘fire and brimstone’ sermons. Modern Christian theological scholars are now presenting much more sophisticated and respectable justifications for their believing in God. These biblical scholars and philosophers of religion present numerous philosophical arguments in the hope that audiences will find them reason enough to accept that God exists, and then present historical arguments centred on Jesus of Nazareth, in order to demonstrate the exclusive truth of the Christian faith. The arguments of these scholars, with particular focus on William Lane Craig’s case for Christian theism, are analysed in this thesis, in order to determine if they are persuasive. Further consideration is given to the sociological impact of the indefatigable William Lane Craig in the public sphere, including his tactics in engaging with his vocal opponents and the general public. It is contended that the arguments put forth by Christian evidentialists such as William Lane Craig are unconvincing. The reasons for their failure are numerous. For example, many of the premises are asserted without adequate justification, and are thus rejected by opponents. It is revealed that the majority of the arguments are not only unpersuasive, but also technically irrelevant, in that they do not argue for the existence of the specific god of theism, or the exclusive truth of any one religion. The only truly relevant arguments – which centre on Jesus – are found to be logically fallacious and to rely on the misuse and misunderstanding of critical historical and probabilistic methods. Alternative god-models such as polytheism, deism, pantheism, and pandeism are considered. Several of these positions, it is argued, are more plausible than the classical theism of Christian evidentialists such as Craig. Public perceptions of the influential Craig are largely found to be positive, even among some non-believers, and it is concluded that the public dissemination of his fallacious arguments and methods should be regarded as insidious