This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers “exotic” cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test. (author's abstract
The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tre...
Muraviev I, Riedel F, Sass L. Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATI...
The aim of this work is to propose a logical framework for representing interacting agents in the co...
This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Wit...
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive for...
Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the game. In a series of papers, Douglas Bridges investigated c...
Extensive form games modeling continuous-time decisions are plagued with problems of nonexistence an...
Abstract: The complexity of algorithms that compute strategies or operate on them typically depends ...
We describe a generalization of extensive-form games that greatly increases representational power w...
ABSTRACT. We prove a theorem computing the number of solutions to a system of equations which is gen...
What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form...
We propose an alternative to the tree representation of extensive form games. Games in product form ...
By Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger. Springer Series in Game Theory. New York: Springer Natur...
Consider a player playing against different opponents in two extensive form games simultaneously. Ca...
Consider a player playing against different opponents in two extensive form games simultaneously. Ca...
The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tre...
Muraviev I, Riedel F, Sass L. Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATI...
The aim of this work is to propose a logical framework for representing interacting agents in the co...
This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Wit...
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive for...
Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the game. In a series of papers, Douglas Bridges investigated c...
Extensive form games modeling continuous-time decisions are plagued with problems of nonexistence an...
Abstract: The complexity of algorithms that compute strategies or operate on them typically depends ...
We describe a generalization of extensive-form games that greatly increases representational power w...
ABSTRACT. We prove a theorem computing the number of solutions to a system of equations which is gen...
What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form...
We propose an alternative to the tree representation of extensive form games. Games in product form ...
By Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger. Springer Series in Game Theory. New York: Springer Natur...
Consider a player playing against different opponents in two extensive form games simultaneously. Ca...
Consider a player playing against different opponents in two extensive form games simultaneously. Ca...
The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tre...
Muraviev I, Riedel F, Sass L. Kuhn's Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATI...
The aim of this work is to propose a logical framework for representing interacting agents in the co...