the shapley-value compared to solutions of cooperative n-person games in extensive form and to aspirations

summary: (preface) this paper was proposed by an article by a. rapoport, where a new model of coalition formation and a corresponding payoff distribution is described. the model treated in detail, whereby the solutions are compared to the shapley-value, and the influence of indifferent players and dummy players is investigated. the model is extended to games with sidepayments and applied to 3- and 4-person games. finally the attempt is made to relate the shapely-value to the set of aspirations.the question why shapley-value and expected value differ for games with more than 3 players is answered satisfactory, as well as the question how dummy players and indifferent players influence the outcome of the game. the structure of 3- and 4-person games with sidepayments are described in detail. the comparison of shapley-value and aspirations shoes the different nature of the two solution concepts. only in very restricted cases some connexion can be seen.