nichtkooperative zweipersonenspiele mit unvollstaendiger information: ein vergleich mit spieldynamischen evolutionsmodellen

abstract: the aim of this paper is the comparison of the methods in the so-called "evolutionary game theory" used recently in theoretical biology with some aspects of the (human) noncooperative game theory and - if possible - the classification of some notions in that theory. some needed results on noncooperative two-person games with incomplete information are specified and, in the first instance, symmetrical evolutionary games are introduced and supplied with a dynamic model. the properties of the fixed points of this dynamic - the "dynamic equilibria" - are compared with that of the nash-equilibrium. as an example of application, the dynamic of the so-called generalized war of attrition is investigated further. the dynamic of asymmetricconflicts and asymmetric dynamic equilibria are introduced in a similar way to the symmetric case. as an interesting special case, a situation of partial indifference is studied by means of the developed game dynamic.