calculation of a priori power distributions for the united nations

abstract (introduction; abridged): as luce and raiffa have pointed out, one of the most interesting and fruitful applications of n-person game theory to a sociological problem is the estimation of the a priori power distribution as determined by theconstitution of a voting committee. in this paper we are trying to make such an application: our problem here is the calculation of relative voting strengths of the members of the united nations, the voting issue being world politics security questions (see articles 24 and 39 ff. of the charta of the united nations). (...) in this paper we shall pose three questions and shall try to answer them in a quantitative manner: 1) how does the power distribution in the united nations look like nowadays? 2) did the 1963 amendment of the charta (effective since aug. 31, 1965) involve a change in power distribution or was it only a ficticious modification? 3) what effect on the power distribution would the abolition of the veto of the "big five" in the security council have?