Sandholm WH, Staudigl M. Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, I: Theory. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 505. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2014.We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best response protocols, allowing the probabilities of suboptimal choices to depend on their payoff consequences. Our analysis focuses on behavior in the small noise double limit: we first take the noise level in agents’ decisions to zero, and then take the population size to infinity. We show that in this double limit, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. These are used in...
Abstract. Stochastic selection models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the...
Recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selec...
This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic ga...
We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocols, allowing th...
Sandholm WH, Staudigl M. Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, ...
We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best response protocols, allowing th...
In this article we review a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocol...
A population of agents recurrently plays a two-strategy population game. When an agent receives a re...
Abstract. We present a general model of stochastic evolution in games played by large populations of...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A popu...
This paper presents a general framework for analysing stochastic stability in models with evolution ...
This paper presents a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions in the direction of highe...
International audienceMotivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical application...
Staudigl M. Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games. Games and Economic ...
We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents cho...
Abstract. Stochastic selection models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the...
Recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selec...
This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic ga...
We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocols, allowing th...
Sandholm WH, Staudigl M. Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, ...
We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best response protocols, allowing th...
In this article we review a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocol...
A population of agents recurrently plays a two-strategy population game. When an agent receives a re...
Abstract. We present a general model of stochastic evolution in games played by large populations of...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A popu...
This paper presents a general framework for analysing stochastic stability in models with evolution ...
This paper presents a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions in the direction of highe...
International audienceMotivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical application...
Staudigl M. Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games. Games and Economic ...
We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents cho...
Abstract. Stochastic selection models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the...
Recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selec...
This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic ga...