Add to ORKGCrott HW, Albers W. The equal division kernel: an equitiy approach to coalition formation and payoff distribution in n-person games. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 98. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 1980
Rosenmüller J. The rôle of nondegeneracy and homogeneity in n-person game theory. Working Papers. In...
In this paper, two existing optimal allocation to N-person cooperative games are reviewed for compar...
n-person games, Cooperative games, Central-union theory, Equal excess model, Myerson–Shapley solutio...
SIGLETIB Hannover: RN 5363 (98) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Inform...
Crott HW, Scholz RW, Albers W. Equal division kernel and referenc coalitions in three-person games. ...
SIGLETIB Hannover: RN 5363 (111) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Infor...
Bitter D. The kernel for the grand coalition of the four person game. Working Papers. Institute of M...
Bitter D. The kernel for the grand coalition of the four person game. Working Papers. Institute of M...
International audienceThe coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequa...
International audienceThe coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequa...
The Equal Division Core (EDC) of a transferable utility cooperative game (TU game) is the set of eff...
In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying th...
Sun N, Trockel W, Yang Z. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person gam...
The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using ...
[[abstract]]Maschler, Peleg and Shapley make use of the bisection property of the kernel to provide ...
Rosenmüller J. The rôle of nondegeneracy and homogeneity in n-person game theory. Working Papers. In...
In this paper, two existing optimal allocation to N-person cooperative games are reviewed for compar...
n-person games, Cooperative games, Central-union theory, Equal excess model, Myerson–Shapley solutio...
SIGLETIB Hannover: RN 5363 (98) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Inform...
Crott HW, Scholz RW, Albers W. Equal division kernel and referenc coalitions in three-person games. ...
SIGLETIB Hannover: RN 5363 (111) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Infor...
Bitter D. The kernel for the grand coalition of the four person game. Working Papers. Institute of M...
Bitter D. The kernel for the grand coalition of the four person game. Working Papers. Institute of M...
International audienceThe coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequa...
International audienceThe coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequa...
The Equal Division Core (EDC) of a transferable utility cooperative game (TU game) is the set of eff...
In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying th...
Sun N, Trockel W, Yang Z. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person gam...
The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using ...
[[abstract]]Maschler, Peleg and Shapley make use of the bisection property of the kernel to provide ...
Rosenmüller J. The rôle of nondegeneracy and homogeneity in n-person game theory. Working Papers. In...
In this paper, two existing optimal allocation to N-person cooperative games are reviewed for compar...
n-person games, Cooperative games, Central-union theory, Equal excess model, Myerson–Shapley solutio...