Add to ORKGSelten R. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 23. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 1974
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
Selten R. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Workin...
This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness con...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
Selten R. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Workin...
This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness con...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
We provide a characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...
In strategic-form games Selten's (1975) perfect equilibria are admissible. This is not true for exte...