Law as clinical evidence: a new constitutive model of medical education and decision-making

Over several decades, ethics and law have been applied to medical education and practice in a way that reflects the continuation during the twentieth century of the strong distinction between facts and values. We explain the development of applied ethics and applied medical law and report selected results that reflect this applied model from an empirical project examining doctors\u27 decisions on withdrawing/withholding treatment from patients who lack decision-making capacity. The model is critiqued, and an alternative constitutive model is supported on the basis that medicine, medical law, and medical ethics exemplify the inevitable entanglement of facts and values. The model requires that ethics and law be taught across the medical education curriculum and integrated with the basic and clinical sciences and that they be perceived as an integral component of medical evidence and practice. Law, in particular, would rank as equal in normative authority to the relevant clinical scientific facts of the case, with graduating doctors having as strong a basic command of each category as the other. The normalization of legal knowledge as part of the clinician\u27s evidence base to be utilized in practice may provide adequate consolation for clinicians who may initially resent further perceived incursions on their traditional independence and discretion