Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 7: a bargaining problem with transaction costs on one side. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 136. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 1984
This paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions. Consumers choose a seller ...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
We first analyze a pure bargaining problem where n players can split a pie on a unanimous agreement....
SIGLETIB: RN 5363 (136) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Informationsbi...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution c...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in stand...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of...
SIGLEBibliothek Weltwirtschaft Kiel YY11,509 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Tech...
SIGLETIB: RN 5363 (132) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Informationsbi...
Selten R, Güth W. Equilibrium point selection in a class of market entry games. Working Papers. Inst...
SIGLETIB Hannover: RN 5363 (114) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Infor...
Selten R, Güth W. Game theoretical analysis of wage bargaining in a simple business cycle model. Wor...
Abstract. Bargaining is one of the most common negotiation situation. Agents must reach an agreement...
The methods of game theory are used to discuss three features pertinent to numerous economic interac...
Contains fulltext : 27003.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)Game Theory is a...
This paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions. Consumers choose a seller ...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
We first analyze a pure bargaining problem where n players can split a pie on a unanimous agreement....
SIGLETIB: RN 5363 (136) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Informationsbi...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution c...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in stand...
Harsanyi JC, Selten R. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of...
SIGLEBibliothek Weltwirtschaft Kiel YY11,509 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Tech...
SIGLETIB: RN 5363 (132) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Informationsbi...
Selten R, Güth W. Equilibrium point selection in a class of market entry games. Working Papers. Inst...
SIGLETIB Hannover: RN 5363 (114) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische Infor...
Selten R, Güth W. Game theoretical analysis of wage bargaining in a simple business cycle model. Wor...
Abstract. Bargaining is one of the most common negotiation situation. Agents must reach an agreement...
The methods of game theory are used to discuss three features pertinent to numerous economic interac...
Contains fulltext : 27003.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)Game Theory is a...
This paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions. Consumers choose a seller ...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
We first analyze a pure bargaining problem where n players can split a pie on a unanimous agreement....