Add to ORKGTo what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision making? We analyze the relevance of asymmetric market pressures as compared to that of formal voting and agenda setting rules by applying three established bargaining models to the 'EMU Positions' data. Accounting for the interdependence between issues and agreements, we locate actors' positions on three reform dimensions, namely the level of fiscal discipline, transfer payments and institutionalization. We find that market pressure during the height of the Eurozone crisis was particularly relevant, and that debtor countries were weakened by their difficulty in refinancing their public debt. Our finding shows that formal rules determining agenda...
The Conclusions of the European Council on 28-29 October 2010 suggest the need for further consultat...
Analyzing international negotiations among the member states of the European Union raises a number o...
This paper argues that the strong member states of the European Currency Union are hostages of a fin...
To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision mak...
During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called ‘Merkozy duumvirate’ emerged as an informal, but highly vi...
Supplemental Material for Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market ...
During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called ‘Merkozy duumvirate’ emerged as an informal, but highly vi...
This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 20...
At the time of the September 1992 crisis, the conventional wisdom held in the ERM was due to an unfo...
This article analyses the causal factors underlying the formation of French preferences during the E...
This essay attempts to go beyond presenting the bits and pieces of still ongoing crisis management i...
The paper sets out to explain why the European Central Bank and the European Commission relaxed thei...
With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament (EP) obtained co-decision rights in economic governa...
The Conclusions of the European Council on 28-29 October 2010 suggest the need for further consultat...
Analyzing international negotiations among the member states of the European Union raises a number o...
This paper argues that the strong member states of the European Currency Union are hostages of a fin...
To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision mak...
During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called ‘Merkozy duumvirate’ emerged as an informal, but highly vi...
Supplemental Material for Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market ...
During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called ‘Merkozy duumvirate’ emerged as an informal, but highly vi...
This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 20...
At the time of the September 1992 crisis, the conventional wisdom held in the ERM was due to an unfo...
This article analyses the causal factors underlying the formation of French preferences during the E...
This essay attempts to go beyond presenting the bits and pieces of still ongoing crisis management i...
The paper sets out to explain why the European Central Bank and the European Commission relaxed thei...
With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament (EP) obtained co-decision rights in economic governa...
The Conclusions of the European Council on 28-29 October 2010 suggest the need for further consultat...
Analyzing international negotiations among the member states of the European Union raises a number o...
This paper argues that the strong member states of the European Currency Union are hostages of a fin...