We analyze Nash equilibrium in fiscal competition with tax and public investment between symmetric regions. We show that given the opposite strategic nature of tax (strategic complement) and public investment (strategic substitute), there is possibility of multiple equilibria. We find that if strategic substitute effect dominates strategic complement effect, then both regions have first mover advantage in a timing game and simultaneous move Nash equilibrium (early, early) emerges; otherwise sequential move equilibria-(early, late) and (late, early) emerges. Also, sequential move Nash equilibria are Pareto improving than simultaneous move outcome. Lastly, race-to-the-bottom in taxes is restricted in sequential move equilibria
International audienceTax competition is often associated with the “race to the bottom:” a decrease ...
This paper studies fiscal competition among jurisdictions in a dynamic framework, where the degree o...
The paper considers a model of a federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the c...
We analyze Nash equilibrium in fiscal competition with tax and public investment between symmetric r...
We construct a general equilibrium model of a two-country trading block where governments through ta...
Leadership (sequential choice) and political delegation are two mechanisms suggested to restrict ‘ra...
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation ...
This article examines a model in which two jurisdictions engage in fiscal competition. The jurisdict...
Papers that examine fiscal competition for mobile factors of production commonly employ simultaneous...
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation ...
Two contiguous regions compete to attract a population of heterogeneous firms. They choose infrastru...
This paper examines symmetric Nash equilibria of a two-country model of fiscal competition with a co...
This paper develops a model of inter-regional competition for mobile capital considering that region...
This note shows that in the Sodrow-Miesowski-Wilson model, the Nash equilibrium in capital taxes dep...
This paper analyzes a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and mobile identical co...
International audienceTax competition is often associated with the “race to the bottom:” a decrease ...
This paper studies fiscal competition among jurisdictions in a dynamic framework, where the degree o...
The paper considers a model of a federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the c...
We analyze Nash equilibrium in fiscal competition with tax and public investment between symmetric r...
We construct a general equilibrium model of a two-country trading block where governments through ta...
Leadership (sequential choice) and political delegation are two mechanisms suggested to restrict ‘ra...
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation ...
This article examines a model in which two jurisdictions engage in fiscal competition. The jurisdict...
Papers that examine fiscal competition for mobile factors of production commonly employ simultaneous...
In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation ...
Two contiguous regions compete to attract a population of heterogeneous firms. They choose infrastru...
This paper examines symmetric Nash equilibria of a two-country model of fiscal competition with a co...
This paper develops a model of inter-regional competition for mobile capital considering that region...
This note shows that in the Sodrow-Miesowski-Wilson model, the Nash equilibrium in capital taxes dep...
This paper analyzes a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and mobile identical co...
International audienceTax competition is often associated with the “race to the bottom:” a decrease ...
This paper studies fiscal competition among jurisdictions in a dynamic framework, where the degree o...
The paper considers a model of a federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the c...