Add to ORKGIn non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members will maximize their joint payoffs. Through an example, this note shows that this assumption is problematic, because it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on cartel members' actions. We recommend that the cartel agreement should be endogenously determined in future studies
In amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no ...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...
In non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members...
Previous work on the formation and stability of cartels has focused on the case of identical players...
We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-pr...
The endogenous formation of coalitions involving asymmetric firms and their stability are analyzed a...
A simple oligopolistic common-pool exhaustible resource game is considered. By analyzing punishment ...
We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming th...
A simple oligopolistic common-pool exhaustible resource game is considered. By analysing punishment ...
In this paper I analyse the stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and externaliti...
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? In o...
This article analyses how the degree of product differentiation, the size of the cartel and the size...
We investigate the stability of cooperation agreements, such as those agreed by cartels, among firms...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
In amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no ...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...
In non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members...
Previous work on the formation and stability of cartels has focused on the case of identical players...
We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-pr...
The endogenous formation of coalitions involving asymmetric firms and their stability are analyzed a...
A simple oligopolistic common-pool exhaustible resource game is considered. By analyzing punishment ...
We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming th...
A simple oligopolistic common-pool exhaustible resource game is considered. By analysing punishment ...
In this paper I analyse the stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and externaliti...
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? In o...
This article analyses how the degree of product differentiation, the size of the cartel and the size...
We investigate the stability of cooperation agreements, such as those agreed by cartels, among firms...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
In amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no ...
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has n...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...