In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over the set of students. These priority orderings depend on criteria such as whether a student lives within walking distance or has a sibling already at the school. I argue that by including just the priority orderings in the problem, and not the criteria themselves, we lose important information. More particularly, the priority orderings fail to capture important aspects of the information from which they are derived when a student may satisfy a given criterion across multiple schools. This loss of information results in mechanisms that discriminate between students in ways that are not easy to justify. I propose an extended formulation of the school choice problem wherein a “...
Abstract: The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice pro-cedures in use. Yet, the ...
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at th...
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at th...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over the set of students. These prior...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over the set of students. These prior...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over the set of students. These prior...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderin...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderin...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderin...
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are al...
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are al...
AA classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is tha...
We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to ...
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency an...
Very little is known about the student-optimal stable mechanism when school priorities are weak. In ...
Abstract: The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice pro-cedures in use. Yet, the ...
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at th...
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at th...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over the set of students. These prior...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over the set of students. These prior...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over the set of students. These prior...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderin...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderin...
In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over students. These priority orderin...
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are al...
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are al...
AA classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is tha...
We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to ...
This paper proposes a way to allocate students to schools such that conciliates Pareto efficiency an...
Very little is known about the student-optimal stable mechanism when school priorities are weak. In ...
Abstract: The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice pro-cedures in use. Yet, the ...
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at th...
School choice plans in many cities grant students higher priority for some (but not all) seats at th...