This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To this aim, we introduce a three-stage game in which, at the first stage, three independent firms can decide to merge with their competitors via a sequential game of coalition formation and, at the second and third stage, they can optimally revise their qualities and prices, respectively. We study whether such binding agreements (i.e. full or partial mergers) can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game, and analyze their effects on equilibrium qualities, prices and profits. We find that, although profitable, the merger-to-monopoly of all firms is not an outcome of the finite-horizon negotiation, where only part...
Working Paper du GATE 2005-07This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price comp...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in acoalition and i...
We introduce merging strategies and endogenous MQS, borrowed from Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), in S...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This paper studies the incentives for firms competing in vertically differentiated markets to sign b...
This paper studies the incentives for firms competing in vertically differentiated markets to sign b...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This survey introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in...
This survey introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in...
This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price competition with horizontal produ...
In this paper we use a two-stage game to model endogenous mergers. In the second stage of the game, ...
In this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in acoalition and in a merger. We conside...
This survey introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in...
Working Paper du GATE 2005-07This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price comp...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in acoalition and i...
We introduce merging strategies and endogenous MQS, borrowed from Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), in S...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This paper studies the incentives for firms competing in vertically differentiated markets to sign b...
This paper studies the incentives for firms competing in vertically differentiated markets to sign b...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This survey introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in...
This survey introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in...
This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price competition with horizontal produ...
In this paper we use a two-stage game to model endogenous mergers. In the second stage of the game, ...
In this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in acoalition and in a merger. We conside...
This survey introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in...
Working Paper du GATE 2005-07This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price comp...
International audienceIn this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in acoalition and i...
We introduce merging strategies and endogenous MQS, borrowed from Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), in S...