This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Gradstein (1995), or first monopolized and then regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Baron and Myerson (1982). We show that the answer to this question depends on the number of the oligopolistic firms and the size of their fixed costs, as well as on the weight of the producer welfare in the social objective function
The authors analyze the optimal regulatory policy when the firm has better information about demand ...
Optimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than...
Summary: We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator ha...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...
This paper studies whether a monopolist with private marginal cost information has incentives to mak...
We study the regulation of a manager-controlled monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from the earl...
Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982)propose an incentive-compatible, individually rational and ex-ante soci...
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous ...
In this paper, we study how a monopolistic firm with unknown costs may behave under the threat of re...
We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limit...
In this paper we consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets when firms are quantity setters....
In this paper we consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets when firms are quantity setters....
This paper describes an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the use of Ramsey prices by mul...
I study the optimal regulation of a firm producing two goods. The firm has private information about...
The authors analyze the optimal regulatory policy when the firm has better information about demand ...
Optimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than...
Summary: We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator ha...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or reg...
This paper studies whether a monopolist with private marginal cost information has incentives to mak...
We study the regulation of a manager-controlled monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from the earl...
Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982)propose an incentive-compatible, individually rational and ex-ante soci...
We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous ...
In this paper, we study how a monopolistic firm with unknown costs may behave under the threat of re...
We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limit...
In this paper we consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets when firms are quantity setters....
In this paper we consider price regulation in oligopolistic markets when firms are quantity setters....
This paper describes an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the use of Ramsey prices by mul...
I study the optimal regulation of a firm producing two goods. The firm has private information about...
The authors analyze the optimal regulatory policy when the firm has better information about demand ...
Optimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than...
Summary: We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator ha...