Add to ORKGVarious papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. I present a mild refinement that requires robustness against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents, and I show that only defection satisfies this refinement among all the existing equilibria in the literature
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is les...
We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begin...
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private mon...
Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's ...
Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's ...
Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's ...
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private mon...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less...
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under ...
We analyze in…nitely repeated prisoners ’ dilemma games with imper-fect private monitoring, and cons...
Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated games with private ...
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under ...
This dissertation studies private information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. For this ...
The belief-based approach for repeated games with private monitoring studies an important class of s...
This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy e...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is les...
We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begin...
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private mon...
Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's ...
Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's ...
Various papers have presented folk-theorem results that yield efficiency in the repeated Prisoner's ...
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private mon...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less...
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under ...
We analyze in…nitely repeated prisoners ’ dilemma games with imper-fect private monitoring, and cons...
Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated games with private ...
We introduce a class of strategies which generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under ...
This dissertation studies private information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. For this ...
The belief-based approach for repeated games with private monitoring studies an important class of s...
This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy e...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is les...
We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begin...
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private mon...