Games with incomplete preferences are normal-form games where the preferences of the players are defined as partial orders over the outcomes of the game. We define rationality in these games as follows. A rational player forms a set-valued belief of possible strategies selected by the opponent(s) and selects a strategy that is not dominated with respect to this belief. Here, we say a strategy is dominated with respect to the set-valued belief if the player has another strategy that would yield a better outcome according to the player's preference relation, no matter which strategy combination the opponent(s) play among those contained in the belief. We define rationalizable strategies as the logical implication of common knowledge of this r...
This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete prefe...
In this paper we analyze two nested iterative solution procedures for infinite, dynamic games of inc...
In this paper I present conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (cor...
Games with incomplete preferences are normal-form games where the preferences of the players are def...
Games with incomplete preferences are normal-form games where the preferences of the players are def...
This paper introduces a new solution concept for games with incomplete preferences. The concept is b...
This paper introduces a new solution concept for games with incomplete preferences. The concept is b...
This paper introduces a new solution concept for games with incomplete preferences. The concept is b...
Proper rationalizability (schuhmacher, 1999, asheim, 2001) is a concept in epistemic game theory bas...
Proper rationalizability (schuhmacher, 1999, asheim, 2001) is a concept in epistemic game theory bas...
The observed choices of a set of players interacting in various related games are said to be Nash ra...
We propose two characteristics of players' beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of ration...
In normal-form games, rationalizability (Bernheim [3], Pearce [11]) on its own fails to exclude some...
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place a...
In game theory, there is a basic methodological dichotomy between Harsanyi's "game-theoretic" view a...
This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete prefe...
In this paper we analyze two nested iterative solution procedures for infinite, dynamic games of inc...
In this paper I present conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (cor...
Games with incomplete preferences are normal-form games where the preferences of the players are def...
Games with incomplete preferences are normal-form games where the preferences of the players are def...
This paper introduces a new solution concept for games with incomplete preferences. The concept is b...
This paper introduces a new solution concept for games with incomplete preferences. The concept is b...
This paper introduces a new solution concept for games with incomplete preferences. The concept is b...
Proper rationalizability (schuhmacher, 1999, asheim, 2001) is a concept in epistemic game theory bas...
Proper rationalizability (schuhmacher, 1999, asheim, 2001) is a concept in epistemic game theory bas...
The observed choices of a set of players interacting in various related games are said to be Nash ra...
We propose two characteristics of players' beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of ration...
In normal-form games, rationalizability (Bernheim [3], Pearce [11]) on its own fails to exclude some...
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for nonrational behavior. We do not place a...
In game theory, there is a basic methodological dichotomy between Harsanyi's "game-theoretic" view a...
This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete prefe...
In this paper we analyze two nested iterative solution procedures for infinite, dynamic games of inc...
In this paper I present conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (cor...