Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki proposed a new voting theory called Majority Judgment which tries to circumvent this limitation. In Majority Judgment, voters are invited to evaluate candidates in terms taken in a well-known common language. The winner is then the one that obtains the highest median. Since the Majority Judgment proposal was made, authors have detected insufficiencies with this new voting system. This article aims at reducing these insufficiencies by proposing a voting system to decide between the median-based voting and the mean-based one. It proposes, moreover, a new tie-breaking method computing intermedian ranks mean
Winner selection by majority, in elections between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with ...
VOTING THEORY FOR DEMOCRACY provides the concepts and tools for democratic decision making. Voting i...
The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being...
Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Mic...
The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can f...
This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework...
Most important results in Social Choice Theory concern impossibility theorems. They claim that no fu...
The traditional model of the theory of social choice admits a host of impossibility theorems and has...
This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a met...
The median voter theorem is one of the most prominent results of formal political theory and economi...
International audienceThe paper deals with voting rules that require voters to rate the candidates o...
The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choi...
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mat...
This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality...
International audienceIn Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the tradition...
Winner selection by majority, in elections between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with ...
VOTING THEORY FOR DEMOCRACY provides the concepts and tools for democratic decision making. Voting i...
The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being...
Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Mic...
The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can f...
This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework...
Most important results in Social Choice Theory concern impossibility theorems. They claim that no fu...
The traditional model of the theory of social choice admits a host of impossibility theorems and has...
This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a met...
The median voter theorem is one of the most prominent results of formal political theory and economi...
International audienceThe paper deals with voting rules that require voters to rate the candidates o...
The majority judgement is a method of election. It is the consequence of a new theory of social choi...
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mat...
This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality...
International audienceIn Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the tradition...
Winner selection by majority, in elections between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with ...
VOTING THEORY FOR DEMOCRACY provides the concepts and tools for democratic decision making. Voting i...
The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being...