We analise emission permit auctions under leader-follower competition when the leader bids strategically and the follower acts as price-taker both at the auction and the secondary market. We obtain linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction, which is optimal ex-post for the leader. Under specific distributional assumptions we conclude that the auction always awards less permits to the leader than the cost-effective amount. Our central result is a cautionary note on the properties of auctioning under market power. Under interior solution the auction allocation is dominated by grandfathering in terms of aggregated cost with probability one. As a policy implication, the specific design of the a...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73704/1/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00294.x.pd
Purpose – This study constitutes a first attempt to experimentally test the performance of a 100% au...
Prior research has shown, on the one hand, that firms subject to a cap-and-trade system can enjoy sc...
We analyze emission permit auctions in a framework in which a dominant firm enjoys market power both...
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is ...
We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permit...
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is ...
This paper contributes to the literature on market power in emissions permits markets, modeling an e...
We study the efficiency of the uniform auction as an allocation mechanism for emission permits amon...
One of the most controversial aspects of a tradable permit market is the initial allocationof pollut...
One of the most controversial aspects of tradable-permit markets is the initial allocation of pollut...
This study constitutes a first attempt to experimentally test the performance of a 100% auction vers...
Objective - This chapter examines the performance of the market to discover efficient equilibrium un...
In theory, efficiency and compliance levels induced by an emission trading system should not depend ...
To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done ...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73704/1/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00294.x.pd
Purpose – This study constitutes a first attempt to experimentally test the performance of a 100% au...
Prior research has shown, on the one hand, that firms subject to a cap-and-trade system can enjoy sc...
We analyze emission permit auctions in a framework in which a dominant firm enjoys market power both...
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is ...
We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permit...
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is ...
This paper contributes to the literature on market power in emissions permits markets, modeling an e...
We study the efficiency of the uniform auction as an allocation mechanism for emission permits amon...
One of the most controversial aspects of a tradable permit market is the initial allocationof pollut...
One of the most controversial aspects of tradable-permit markets is the initial allocation of pollut...
This study constitutes a first attempt to experimentally test the performance of a 100% auction vers...
Objective - This chapter examines the performance of the market to discover efficient equilibrium un...
In theory, efficiency and compliance levels induced by an emission trading system should not depend ...
To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done ...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73704/1/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00294.x.pd
Purpose – This study constitutes a first attempt to experimentally test the performance of a 100% au...
Prior research has shown, on the one hand, that firms subject to a cap-and-trade system can enjoy sc...