In a recent paper, Duersch et.al (2012) showed that in a rather broad class of repeated symmetric two-player games, a player who uses the simple "imitate-if-better" heuristic cannot be subject to a money pump. In this paper, we extend the analysis to games with randomly perturbed payoffs and we show that this result is not robust to, even arbitrarily small, payoff perturbations. In particular, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that characterizes the class of perturbed games in which the imitator can be subject to a money pump
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while t...
Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic $2\t...
This thesis studies a population of agents facing repeatedly the same decision problem. Each agent k...
In a recent paper, Duersch et.al (2012) showed that in a rather broad class of repeated symmetric tw...
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-bet...
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-b...
– 2nd revised version – We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple de-c...
We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question wheth...
Imitation is a simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to handle one's task...
International audienceWe investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populatio...
We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players t...
In consectutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is randomly matched, ob...
An imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the same set...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.This paper introduces a learning algorithm that allows for imi...
We study a simple model of similarity-based global cumulative imitation in symmetric games with larg...
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while t...
Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic $2\t...
This thesis studies a population of agents facing repeatedly the same decision problem. Each agent k...
In a recent paper, Duersch et.al (2012) showed that in a rather broad class of repeated symmetric tw...
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-bet...
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-b...
– 2nd revised version – We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple de-c...
We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question wheth...
Imitation is a simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to handle one's task...
International audienceWe investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populatio...
We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players t...
In consectutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is randomly matched, ob...
An imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the same set...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.This paper introduces a learning algorithm that allows for imi...
We study a simple model of similarity-based global cumulative imitation in symmetric games with larg...
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while t...
Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic $2\t...
This thesis studies a population of agents facing repeatedly the same decision problem. Each agent k...