Add to ORKGWe characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players. As application, we rationalize the active participation of politically engaged individuals as the unique essential equilibrium in an electoral game with a continuum of Cournot-Nash equilibria
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her o...
We consider Nash equilibria of large anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff depends on his cho...
We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form w...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuu...
We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games with a continuu...
We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are atomic. Obj...
We characterize the existence and the essential stability of Weak Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equil...
We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilib...
We consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Object...
Abstract. We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are a...
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players h...
In this paper, we divide the players of a large game into countable different groups and assume that...
In this paper, we divide the players of a large game into countable different groups and assume that...
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal ch...
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her o...
We consider Nash equilibria of large anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff depends on his cho...
We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form w...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuu...
We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games with a continuu...
We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are atomic. Obj...
We characterize the existence and the essential stability of Weak Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equil...
We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilib...
We consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Object...
Abstract. We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are a...
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players h...
In this paper, we divide the players of a large game into countable different groups and assume that...
In this paper, we divide the players of a large game into countable different groups and assume that...
In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal ch...
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her o...
We consider Nash equilibria of large anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff depends on his cho...
We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form w...