We replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) by fairness for neighbors in order to characterize the component-wise egalitarian solution. When a link is broken, fairness states the two players incident to the link should be affected similarly while fairness for neighbors states that a player incident to the link and any of his other neighbors should be affected similarly. Fairness for neighbors is also used to characterize the component-wise egalitarian surplus solution and a two-step egalitarian solution. These results highlight that egalitarian and marginalistic allocation rules can be obtained by applying the same equal gain/loss property to different types of players
In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are loc...
We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization ...
In this paper we study resource allocation problems that involve multiple self-interested parties or...
We replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) b...
International audienceWe replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson v...
We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where th...
We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization ...
We study cooperative transferable utility games with a communication structure represented by an und...
International audienceThis article addresses linear sharing rules on transferable utility games (TU-...
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an u...
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of fair allocation rules and their propertie...
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is...
I prove existence and uniqueness of a component efficient and fair allocation rule when the value of...
Abstract. In this paper we study cooperative transferable utility games with communi-cation structur...
The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a le...
In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are loc...
We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization ...
In this paper we study resource allocation problems that involve multiple self-interested parties or...
We replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) b...
International audienceWe replace the axiom of fairness used in the characterization of the Myerson v...
We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where th...
We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization ...
We study cooperative transferable utility games with a communication structure represented by an und...
International audienceThis article addresses linear sharing rules on transferable utility games (TU-...
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an u...
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of fair allocation rules and their propertie...
We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is...
I prove existence and uniqueness of a component efficient and fair allocation rule when the value of...
Abstract. In this paper we study cooperative transferable utility games with communi-cation structur...
The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a le...
In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are loc...
We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization ...
In this paper we study resource allocation problems that involve multiple self-interested parties or...