Add to ORKGThis paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative
King (1997) develops a framework for assessing four monetary regimes: an optimal state-contingent ru...
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. ...
In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and...
This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering...
Kobayashi (2003) aims to show that, in a model without inflationary bias, an increase in the degree ...
This paper focuses on the “contingent” view of transparency. By introducing endogenous fiscal policy...
Abstract: This paper analyzes the rationale for delegating monetary pol-icy to an in°ation-averse ce...
This dissertation offers two perspectives on the making of monetary policy under uncertainty. The fi...
What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This paper investigates the issue in a fram...
We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under...
This paper extends the model of Chortareas and Miller (2003) to the case of a continuum of central b...
This paper adapts in a simple static context the Rogoff's (1985) analysis of monetary policy delegat...
We underline that some results obtained in the literature on central bank transparency may be quite ...
We study the problem of a central bank whose policy actions simultaneously affect the information fl...
This paper addresses the issue of monetary policy transparency in a context of model uncertainty by ...
King (1997) develops a framework for assessing four monetary regimes: an optimal state-contingent ru...
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. ...
In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and...
This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering...
Kobayashi (2003) aims to show that, in a model without inflationary bias, an increase in the degree ...
This paper focuses on the “contingent” view of transparency. By introducing endogenous fiscal policy...
Abstract: This paper analyzes the rationale for delegating monetary pol-icy to an in°ation-averse ce...
This dissertation offers two perspectives on the making of monetary policy under uncertainty. The fi...
What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This paper investigates the issue in a fram...
We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under...
This paper extends the model of Chortareas and Miller (2003) to the case of a continuum of central b...
This paper adapts in a simple static context the Rogoff's (1985) analysis of monetary policy delegat...
We underline that some results obtained in the literature on central bank transparency may be quite ...
We study the problem of a central bank whose policy actions simultaneously affect the information fl...
This paper addresses the issue of monetary policy transparency in a context of model uncertainty by ...
King (1997) develops a framework for assessing four monetary regimes: an optimal state-contingent ru...
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. ...
In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and...