Add to ORKGWe demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded
This is a successive oligopoly model with two brands. Each downstream firm chooses one brand to sell...
In a spatial competition model, changes in firms’ competitive behaviour may occur when the hypothesi...
In spatial competition models « à la Hotelling », we can treat simultaneously of two components of i...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at som...
This is a successive oligopoly model with two brands. Each downstream firm chooses one brand to sell...
In a spatial competition model, changes in firms’ competitive behaviour may occur when the hypothesi...
In spatial competition models « à la Hotelling », we can treat simultaneously of two components of i...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial co...
This analysis is a natural follow up of continued efforts to assess the consequences of cross-border...
The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Ch...
We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its re...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
This paper examines the location of three vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy composed of ...
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at som...
This is a successive oligopoly model with two brands. Each downstream firm chooses one brand to sell...
In a spatial competition model, changes in firms’ competitive behaviour may occur when the hypothesi...
In spatial competition models « à la Hotelling », we can treat simultaneously of two components of i...