Add to ORKGWhen two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written
In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a “comple...
In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopt...
When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can b...
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of ...
Two parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collaborate in order to gene...
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of ...
The property rights approach to the theory of the firm is the most prominent application of the inco...
AbstractTwo parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collaborate in order...
We explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in R&D alliances using the incomplete co...
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments conf...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
This paper presents a model of the joint venture that is grounded in the stylized facts we found fro...
Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Wh...
Ownership may not always be the best driver for investment incentives in an incomplete contract cont...
In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a “comple...
In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopt...
When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can b...
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of ...
Two parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collaborate in order to gene...
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of ...
The property rights approach to the theory of the firm is the most prominent application of the inco...
AbstractTwo parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collaborate in order...
We explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in R&D alliances using the incomplete co...
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments conf...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
This paper presents a model of the joint venture that is grounded in the stylized facts we found fro...
Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Wh...
Ownership may not always be the best driver for investment incentives in an incomplete contract cont...
In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed...
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a “comple...
In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopt...