Add to ORKGIn this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to manipulate market equilibrium by destroying and withholding ones initial endowments
We study a mechanism design problem for exchange economies where each agent is initially endowed wit...
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rul...
This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with ...
In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to ma...
In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit ...
This work deals with the possibility of coalitions to manipulate the competitive equilibrium allocat...
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rul...
Scarf's economy has been a vehicle in understanding stability properties in exchange economies. The ...
This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with ...
This paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincid...
If property rights to consumption goods are insecure, the incentives to trade in a barter economy ar...
This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with ...
[eng] This thesis is devoted mainly to the study of assignment problems in two- sided markets. The ...
This paper explores alternatives to the vVa1rasian Auctioneer for the allocation of resources in a p...
We study the assignment of objects in environments without transfers allowing for single-unit and ge...
We study a mechanism design problem for exchange economies where each agent is initially endowed wit...
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rul...
This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with ...
In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to ma...
In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit ...
This work deals with the possibility of coalitions to manipulate the competitive equilibrium allocat...
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rul...
Scarf's economy has been a vehicle in understanding stability properties in exchange economies. The ...
This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with ...
This paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincid...
If property rights to consumption goods are insecure, the incentives to trade in a barter economy ar...
This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with ...
[eng] This thesis is devoted mainly to the study of assignment problems in two- sided markets. The ...
This paper explores alternatives to the vVa1rasian Auctioneer for the allocation of resources in a p...
We study the assignment of objects in environments without transfers allowing for single-unit and ge...
We study a mechanism design problem for exchange economies where each agent is initially endowed wit...
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rul...
This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with ...