The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked
Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of indi...
A simple game (N; v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of losing ...
A simple game (N, v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of lo...
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-crite...
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Social choice and welfar...
It was shown earlier that the class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the clas...
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, p...
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace th...
International audienceThis paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper vo...
This paper characterizes acyclic preference aggregation rules under various combinations of monotoni...
We study so-called invariant games played with a fixed number d of heaps of matches. A game is descr...
Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of indi...
A simple game (N; v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of losing ...
A simple game (N, v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of lo...
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-crite...
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Social choice and welfar...
It was shown earlier that the class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the clas...
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, p...
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace th...
International audienceThis paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper vo...
This paper characterizes acyclic preference aggregation rules under various combinations of monotoni...
We study so-called invariant games played with a fixed number d of heaps of matches. A game is descr...
Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of indi...
A simple game (N; v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of losing ...
A simple game (N, v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of lo...