The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura's theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted
For a coalitional game with transferble utility, the undominated core is a set of imputations which ...
A simple game (N; v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of losing ...
A Common Interest game is a game that has a unique vector of payoffs that strictly Pareto-dominates ...
The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finit...
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-crite...
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, p...
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace th...
Simple coalitional games are a fundamental class of cooperative games and voting games which are use...
AbstractCoalitional games model scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in ord...
ABSTRACT. A Common Interest game is a game in which there exists a unique vector of payoffs which st...
summary:We propose a generalization of simple coalition games in the context of games with fuzzy coa...
We study so-called invariant games played with a fixed number d of heaps of matches. A game is descr...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from ACM via the DOI in this ...
For a coalitional game with transferble utility, the undominated core is a set of imputations which ...
A simple game (N; v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of losing ...
A Common Interest game is a game that has a unique vector of payoffs that strictly Pareto-dominates ...
The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finit...
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-crite...
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, p...
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace th...
Simple coalitional games are a fundamental class of cooperative games and voting games which are use...
AbstractCoalitional games model scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in ord...
ABSTRACT. A Common Interest game is a game in which there exists a unique vector of payoffs which st...
summary:We propose a generalization of simple coalition games in the context of games with fuzzy coa...
We study so-called invariant games played with a fixed number d of heaps of matches. A game is descr...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from ACM via the DOI in this ...
For a coalitional game with transferble utility, the undominated core is a set of imputations which ...
A simple game (N; v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of losing ...
A Common Interest game is a game that has a unique vector of payoffs that strictly Pareto-dominates ...