It takes two to tango : can Brazil and the U.S. dance to the same regional beat?

The proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas has come to a standstill. Reasons for this reside in three aspects in which the FTAA differs from other regional integration schemes. First, it would combine existing preferential trading arrangements of which NAFTA and MERCOSUR are the two most significant ones. Second, each of the schemes has an undisputed regional leader: the U.S. and Brazil. However, two hegemons do not agree on a common vision for the hemispheric project. Third, the small membership of the two schemes is to be elevated to an area encompassing 34 states, i.e. to a situation of large n . The literature maintains that the provision of a collective good becomes more difficult the larger the number of members party to the scheme. The solution offered for this problem of large n is the existence of either a hegemon or a group of likeminded states to overcome collective action problems. In the case of the Americas, the solution offered by the literature is the very problem for efforts to integrate the hemisphere. The FTAA negotiations are stalled because the attempt to forge collective action among 34 member states is sought by two countries simultaneously. This thesis suggests that the large n problem of hemispheric integration will be resolved by the hegemon more successful in subdividing the group size and imposing its vision. The research of this study therefore compares the procedural strategies of the U.S. and Brazil in their quest to shape the substance of the regional schem